Neuroethics is an interdisciplinary field that arose in response to novel ethical challenges posed by advances in neuroscience. Historically, neuroethics has provided an opportunity to synergize different disciplines, notably proposing a two-way dialogue between an ‘ethics of neuroscience’ and a ‘neuroscience of ethics’. However, questions surface as to whether a ‘neuroscience of ethics’ is a useful and unified branch of research and whether it can actually inform or lead to theoretical insights and transferable practical knowledge to help resolve ethical questions. (...) In this article, we examine why the neuroscience of ethics is a promising area of research and summarize what we have learned so far regarding its most promising goals and contributions. We then review some of the key methodological challenges which may have hindered the use of results generated thus far by the neuroscience of ethics. Strategies are suggested to address these challenges and improve the quality of research and increase neuroscience's usefulness for applied ethics and society at large. Finally, we reflect on potential outcomes of a neuroscience of ethics and discuss the different strategies that could be used to support knowledge transfer to help different stakeholders integrate knowledge from the neuroscience of ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gender Ideology and the “Artistic” Fabrication of Human Sex: Nature as Norm or the Remaking of the Human?Michele M. SchumacherUntil quite recently,” the famous English novelist C. S. Lewis remarked in 1959, “it was taken for granted that the business of the artist was to delight and instruct his public”: that is to say, to address simultaneously their passions and their intellects. “There were, of course, different publics.... And (...) an artist might lead his public on to appreciate finer things than they had wanted at first; but he could do this only by being; from the first, if not merely entertaining, yet entertaining, and if not completely intelligible, yet very largely intelligible.” This constraint—let us call it intelligent (or purposeful) design, in keeping with a basic analogy that we will draw upon in these pages—had however been lost, Lewis observed. Hence, even “in the highest aesthetic circles one now hears nothing about the artist’s duty to us. It is all about our duty to him. He owes us nothing; we owe him ‘recognition,’ even though he has never paid the slightest attention to our tastes, interests, or habits.”1 In short, the artist of modernity need not pay the slightest attention to an intention, not even his own. Modern art need not be an expression of intelligence or [End Page 363] understanding; it is expression as such (tout court): personal and autonomous.2Lewis’s remarks do not point merely to the increasingly relativist tendencies of art in the Western world, to the lack of objective criteria or norms governing the artistic disciplines. They also point to the growing disregard among artists for the sociocultural expectations of their publicum. Mediating between the two is, without a doubt, the basis upon which both artistic and social norms were traditionally founded: nature, which served as a classic analogy for both art (understood in the broad sense, so as to include not only the fine arts, but also technology and practical sciences) and ethics in virtue of nature’s intrinsic inclination towards its defining end and perfection.With regard to the first of these analogies (that of art and nature), Mark Schiefsky explains that although art does bring about “results that nature itself cannot,” it does so in the classic understanding “by acting in a natural way—the way nature would act if it could generate the products of art.”3 As for the difference between the two, nature is moved to its specifying end by way of intrinsic inclinations that are implicit to it, whereas a work of art is moved to its end extrinsically, and thus with more or less violence.4 A sculptor, for example, who introduces a form into a piece of marble, does so by chiseling [End Page 364] and hammering away at the fine stone.5 “Art is,” Aristotle explains, “the principle and form of the thing that comes to be [let us say, a sculpture]; but it is located elsewhere [in, for example, the artist’s mind or in a sketch that he has made] than in that thing, whereas the movement of nature is located in the thing itself that comes to be [a tree, for example, or a baby], and is derived from another natural organism [a tree or human parents] which possessed the form in actuality.”6This classic distinction between art and nature parallels the distinction between art and ethics. Ethics “does not affect human action in the same way as do art and technique,” Servais Pinckaers explains. Unlike art and technique, which are concerned with “the external work produced by human action”—this painting or that machine, for example—ethics is concerned with an immanent principle, qualifying the actor as such: the stable dispositions (or habitus: virtues or vices) at the origin of “the active willing that is the principle source of the action.”7 This immanent principle at the source of ethical action is—to complete our analogy—creative in only a limited sense. The human person is indeed free to choose, but he or she is not free to decide “what is good or evil” as such, nor what is “good or bad for... (shrink)

A autora retoma a sua trajetória, o que aprendeu ao longo de mais de trinta anos, interessando-se pelas formas como seus contemporâneos leem (ou não leem). Com as reflexões de Michel de Certeau como referência teórica, ela lembra como se colocou ao lado dos leitores, esforçando-se para prestar atenção às suas formas de apropriação e representação de um livro, um texto escrito ou uma biblioteca. Narra como aprofundou a análise da importância da literatura desde a infância, construindo um espaço para (...) se descobrir e simbolizar sua experiência. Em seguida, ela conta como se interessou por experiências literárias compartilhadas que reuniam pessoas que tinham vivido muito distantes da cultura escrita: lugares de "educação informal", oficinas em que a leitura de obras literárias e a arte desempenhavam um papel fundamental, concebidos para vítimas de catástrofes, populações deslocadas, jovens desvinculados de grupos guerrilheiros ou paramilitares, dependentes químicos nas ruas, crianças vítimas de violência doméstica, mulheres com bebês em situação de extrema pobreza... Essas experiências são conduzidas por educadores que tentam fazer algo fora do contexto acadêmico tradicional, ou bibliotecários, promotores de leitura, às vezes psicólogos, artistas, narradores, etc. A autora analisa sua arte de fazer, considerando crianças, adolescentes (e também adultos) em sua dimensão sensível, psíquica, física e não apenas cognitiva. Por fim, ela relembra como refletiu sobre a transmissão cultural, debilitada em muitas famílias: quando a luta pela sobrevivência ou o trabalho ocupa o tempo cotidiano, as crianças perdem uma etapa importante para integrar os diferentes registros da língua. Essa etapa é aquela em que, desde muito cedo, alguém é iniciado no uso das palavras tão vital quanto "inútil", gratuito, muito próximo da vida, das sensações, das emoções, do prazer compartilhado; muito longe do controle e da qualificação. Tudo o que ela estudou a convenceu da importância da literatura, oral e escrita, que atende a uma necessidade antropológica. (shrink)

:In this article, we begin by identifying three main neuroethical approaches: neurobioethics, empirical neuroethics, and conceptual neuroethics. Our focus is on conceptual approaches that generally emphasize the need to develop and use a methodological modus operandi for effectively linking scientific and philosophical interpretations. We explain and assess the value of conceptual neuroethics approaches and explain and defend one such approach that we propose as being particularly fruitful for addressing the various issues raised by neuroscience: fundamental neuroethics.

2020 update of the entry "Properties".

It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities. In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state or affirm that a certain course of political action is (...) the one that should be followed or enacted. Consequently, the performance of acts of political advocacy such as voting should be understood as bounded by epistemic norms mirroring those binding the act of assertion and yield epistemic responsibilities mirroring the ones required to satisfy these norms. (shrink)

As part of recent epistemic challenges to democracy, some have endorsed the implementation of epistemic constraints on voting, institutional mechanisms that bar incompetent voters from participating in public decision-making procedures. This proposal is often considered incompatible with a commitment to political equality. In this paper, I aim to dispute the strength of this latter claim by offering a theoretical justification for epistemic constraints on voting that does not rest on antiegalitarian commitments. Call this the civic accountability justification for epistemic constraints (...) on voting. On this view, voters stand to one another in a normative relation of reciprocal accountability that requires them to uphold an epistemically responsible conduct. Modest epistemic constraints on voting are justifiable because they secure that participation in voting is conforming to this normative requirement. Thanks to its distinctive features, the civic accountability justification can overcome two problems that egalitarians commonly associate with the idea of epistemic constraints on voting: the disrespect problem and the hierarchy problem. (shrink)

I shall defend in this paper the thesis that, if there are irreducible powers such as the power to produce a certain object (generative powers), then there are objects that do not exist and they are part of the fundamental level of the universe. Thus, generative powers come together with Meinongianism. After having clarified my argument, I shall examine and criticize Armstrong (1997)’s attempt to reduce powers to other sorts of entities. Finally, I shall deal with five accounts of generative (...) powers that are somehow alternative to Meinongianism and with some (more general) miscellaneous concerns about the truth of this doctrine. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss an often-neglected topic in the literature on the ethics of voting. Our aim is to provide an account of what states are obligated to do, so that voters may fulfil their role as public decision-makers in an epistemically competent manner. We argue that the state ought to provide voters with what we call a substantive opportunity for competence. This entails that the state ought to actively foster the epistemic capabilities that are necessary to achieve competent (...) participation in political decision-making practices. (shrink)

In the literature, there have been several methods and definitions for working out whether two theories are “equivalent” or not. In this article, we do something subtler. We provide a means to measure distances between formal theories. We introduce two natural notions for such distances. The first one is that of axiomatic distance, but we argue that it might be of limited interest. The more interesting and widely applicable notion is that of conceptual distance which measures the minimum number of (...) concepts that distinguish two theories. For instance, we use conceptual distance to show that relativistic and classical kinematics are distinguished by one concept only. (shrink)

The recently published Guidelines on Disorders of Consciousness by the European Academy of Neurology and by the American Academy of Neurology in collaboration with the American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine and the National Institute on Disability, Independent Living, and Rehabilitation Research stand as the most ambitious international attempts to provide clear and standardized recommendations to clinicians working with patients with DoCs. They offer an updated, timely, and wide-ranging list of recommendations for the diagnosis, prognosis, and clinical care of affected patients. (...) However, while commendable, the guidelines pose a number of questions including some related to the practical implementation of their recommendations. The paper introduces the Distributed Responsibility Model as a tool for maximizing the impact of recommendations in clinical practice. (shrink)

In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full (...) belief, credences, and acceptance. In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of hypothesis. More specifically, I contend that holding an attitude of hypothesis enables us to respond rationally to peer disagreement, and I suggest that such an attitude offers a suitable articulation of the view, originally put forward by Philip Kitcher, that cognitive diversity in inquiry has epistemic benefits. (shrink)

An apparently simple answer to this question is 'diversity': there is a diversity of women readers, diversity of interests, diversity of methods and diversity of results of women reading the Bible. In this article I will discuss the complex reality of the diversity of contemporary women's reading of the Bible. I will discuss women readers under two headings, namely the everyday, non-academic reader on the one hand, and the professional, academically trained biblical exegete on the other. I will first suggest (...) a general comparison of these two groups before I treat each one in greater detail. Finally, I will offer a reading of a story about a woman from the Gospel of Mark that draws on feminist hermeneutics to read for a meaning that liberates women from a burdensome, conventional reading. (shrink)

We analyse the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive justice in the context of social welfare orderings. We study an axiom capturing a liberal non-interfering view of society, the Weak Harm Principle, whose roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mill. We show that liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom can provide consistent foundations for welfare judgements. In particular, a liberal non-interfering approach can help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to intergenerational justice. However, (...) a strong relation is established between liberal views of individual autonomy and non-interference, and egalitarian principles in the Rawlsian tradition. (shrink)

This paper is a reflection on the potential of teaching methodologies that focus on the phenomenon of dissonance or cognitive conflict. In a multicultural and increasingly polarized society, the capacity to question one’s own beliefs and behaviors is certainly one of the skills that the educational system should promote, and the development of this competence is closely related to the effective control of the experience of dissonance originated by new information. Starting from a brief reconstruction of the pedagogical and psychological (...) literature on the subject, I will try to analyze the complexity of the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance by proposing an explanation of the contradictory results of empirical research, identifying as the main problematic nodes the emotional regulation of conflict and the role of the teacher as a facilitator of the process of conceptual change. (shrink)

Institutional operability refers to the normative conditions governing the exercise of power of office that makes an institution work. Because institutional action occurs by the interrelated actions of the officeholders, a focus on institutional operability requires the analysis and assessment of the officeholders’ conduct in their institutional capacity. This article distinguishes two perspectives on operability: ‘outward’ and ‘inward.’ The outward view emphasizes predefined instructions for efficient execution, focusing on rule-following to achieve institutional purposes. The inward perspective highlights role-playing and reflective (...) engagement among officeholders to uphold an institution’s raison d’être. The inward perspective brings to the fore the relational aspect of institutional life and officeholders’ interrelated responsibility for guiding institutional action. (shrink)

Michèle Le Dœuff discusses the revival of feminism in France, including the phenomenon of state-sponsored feminism, such as government support for “parity”: equal numbers of women and men in government. Le Dœuff analyzes the strategically patchy application of this revival and remains wary about it. Turning to the work of seventeenth-century philosopher Gabrielle Suchon, Le Dœuff considers her concepts of freedom, servitude, and active citizenship, which may well, she argues, have influenced Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Le Dœuff favorably juxtaposes the active (...) citizenship defended by Suchon with the kind of citizenship implicitly supported by recent French government feminism. (shrink)

The article addresses the definition of the State as an institution that holds the monopoly of the legitimate use of force/violence. It is divided into three parts: the first one discusses some chief scholarly contributions on the topic. The second focuses on Weber’s use of “monopoly” within his work, with the aim of showing that the expression “monopoly of the legitimate use of force/violence” can be better understood if conceived and explained within the much wider employment of this term. The (...) third part analyses the expression “monopoly of the legitimate use of violence ” in Weber’s Intermediate Reflections. Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions. Trying to grasp the meaning of the expression within this text can be helpful in order to better illustrate its sense within the entire Max Weber’s work. (shrink)

The appearance, in 1967, of the name of Jacques Derrida on the scene of contemporary thought was indeed plural; given the number of books published under his signature in that year, but also, more intrinsically, because this appearance was declined under a contradictory aegis: since the beginning, the problem of writing had to struggle between ‘two interpretations of interpretation’, one affirmative, the other nostalgic, between a Nietzschean affirmation and a Rousseauist reverie. This internal debate carried on its labour, remarking itself (...) much later at the surface of the page, according to more or less conscious protocols. This contribution retraces the terms of this conflict starting from two problems, if not words, where this conflict finds a very economical condensation: ‘pity’ and ‘weak force’, the problems of compassion for the living and of the hyperbole of political interpellation, in the short-circuit that takes shape between the ‘economy of pity’ and the ‘question of the animal’. (shrink)

This paper explores the similarities between a crucial passage in Robert Grosseteste’s commentary on Posterior Analytics and the commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 6 written by the Byzantine commentator Eustratius of Nicaea (d. ca. 1120). According to the present author, Eustratius may be the direct source of Grosseteste’s epistemology and concept formation theory in the commentary. A tentative revision of the chronology of Grosseteste’s Greek studies may be necessary to account for the relationship between the two texts.

This paper extends the analysis of liberal principles in social choice recently proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009a) to infinitely-lived societies. First, some novel characterisations of inegalitarian leximax social welfare relations are derived based on the Individual Benefit Principle (IBP), which incorporates a liberal, non-interfering view of society. This is surprising because the IBP does not explicitly incorporate any preference for inequality, nor does it assign priority to well-off members of society. Second, some impossibility results are derived that highlight a (...) general tension between standard fairness and efficiency axioms in social choice, and a liberal Principle of Non-Interference that generalises IBP. (shrink)

Several philosophers maintain that outright belief exists because it plays a reasoning simplifying role (Holton 2008; Ross and Schroeder 2014; Staffel 2019; Weisberg 2020). This claim has been recently contested, on the grounds that credences also can simplify reasoning (Dinges 2021). This paper takes a step back and asks: what features of an attitude explain its alleged ability to simplify reasoning? The paper contrasts two explanations, one in terms of dispositions and the other in terms of representation, arguing in favour (...) of the latter and against the former. The proposed explanation yields two interesting results: first, both belief and other attitudes, such as acceptance and imagination, can play a reasoning simplifying role; second, credences do not simplify our reasoning. (shrink)

This essay presents a personal remembering of Rudolf Haller and deals with his interpretation and evaluation of Meinong’s theory of impossible and incomplete objects in order to better understand the objects of fiction and imagination.